Abstract. In recent years, it has become more and more evident that software threat communities are taking an increasing interest in Grid infrastructures. To mitigate the security risk associated with the increased numbers of attacks, the Grid software development community needs to scale up effort to reduce software vulnerabilities. This can be achieved by introducing security review processes as a standard project management practice.
Introduction
Until recently, the exploit community for Grid systems has been active targeting classical software services, such as ssh, rather than vulnerability in the Grid middleware. As the exploit community becomes more organized, developers of Grid middleware must become more mature in the avoidance and detection of security weaknesses. The Grid Facilities Department of the Fermilab Computing Division, has attempted to improve its awareness of security in software development by defining, utilizing, and refining a code inspection process that targets security reviews. The version 1.0 of this process has been released in March 2009. The inspection process is loosely inspired by the Fagan inspection [1], which defines certain personnel roles and a workflow of activities, including meetings. This paper is organized as follows. The scope and goals of the inspection process is discussed in sec. 2. The definition of the roles, the deliverables, and the inspection workflow is described in sec. Error! Reference source not found.. The core of the inspection is the security review itself: the security review process consists of six steps and is detailed in sec. 4. Section 5 summarizes the conclusions of the paper.
Scope and Goals
The goal of this inspection process is to assess potential vulnerabilities related to the security properties of a software artifact. The core of the inspection process is a security review, which has the goal of identifying technical risks associated with the application and of evaluating the impact of these technical risks. Examples of technical risks are vulnerabilities, flaws in application code and architecture, and other technical problems or complications. Examples of the impacts of these risks are unexpected system crashes and avoidance of security control, including unauthorized data modification or disclosure. Optionally, the process can generate application quality metrics, such as the number or "density" of defects in the code, number of critical risks, etc. In addition, a side-goal for the process is improving the process itself, by re-evaluating it with each inspection. The process focuses on studying the security issues with the code itself, rather than with the operations of the software. For example, the process would focus on uncovering avoidance of security controls, rather than on how system passwords are protected and distributed or on how patches are maintained. In any case, since the line between software and operational issues is often blurred, in the process, reviewers are asked to familiarize themselves with high-level operational practices. The inspection process does not discuss how to select the software artifact that should be reviewed. This task is left as a responsibility of line management. The process; however, allows for a quick rejection of an artifact, in case its security sensitivity is evaluated to be too low-risk to justify the cost of a full review. To achieve the goals of the process, the reviewers should study the software artifact with the following in mind: 
The Inspection Process
The inspection process is inspired by the Fagan inspection [1] and uses a similar workflow and organization of personnel roles. The following sections describe the roles, deliverables, and workflow of the process.
Personnel Roles
The process defines the following roles for the personnel participating in the inspection
• Management: the line and project management of the personnel participating in the inspection. Management must support the inspection review activity in order for it to be successful, allowing for the appropriate time to be spent on the review and on addressing the issues listed in the Inspection Report. The inspection is typically initiated by a manager with a stake in a software artifact: the selection process for the artifact is outside of the scope of this document.
• Moderator: the person responsible for the inspection. The Moderator collaborates with Management to appoint the personnel participating in the review. He or she organizes the inspection according to the inspection workflow (sec. 3.3). The Moderator is also responsible to "moderate" the interactions between members of the inspection with different roles (e.g. Reviewers and Authors).
• Author: the main developer(s) of the software artifact. Author(s) are responsible for working with the Reviewers, providing material and expertise on the artifact. Author(s) are also responsible for following up with the recommendations for improving the artifact, as documented in the Inspection Report.
• Reviewer: a person reviewing the software artifact. Reviewers typically have particular expertise or interest in the domain of the software artifact. Reviewers are highly encouraged to follow the Security Review Process described in sec. 4 and provide feedback on it. Reviewers are responsible for documenting the outcomes of their review in a Security Review Report.
• Scribe: a person participating in the meetings and taking notes on behalf of the group. The scribe should always feel free to interrupt the conversation to make sure that the record is accurate.
• Security Expert: this is typically a representative of the Security Team. His/her input is useful to weigh the sensitivity of the issues exposed by the review.
Deliverables of the Inspection
The deliverable of the process is an Inspection Report. The report consists of the Security Review Report from the Reviewers (sec. 4) and documentation of relevant discussions between Authors and Reviewers, as compiled by the Moderator using the notes from the Scribe.
The outcome of the process should give Authors enough information to improve the quality of the software artifact. It is the responsibility of the Authors, possibly in consultation with their Management, to decide what recommendations of the Inspection Report to implement.
Inspection Workflow
This section describes the workflow of the inspection. 
2). The Inspection
Report should include a list of issues for the Authors. In all cases, it is up to the Authors to decide whether an issue will require some action. If the Authors decide that a particular issue can be ignored, a very good reason must be stated as to why this is the best course of action. This reason must be documented in the Report. The Security Team can be involved to provide input on the relevance of each issue.
9. Follow up meeting: This meeting is optional. Its goal is to follow up with the Authors on the issues listed in the Inspection Report. It should happen several weeks after the Inspection Report has been finalized.
The Security Review
The security review process has the goal of identifying technical risks and their impact. The Security Review is the core part of the Inspection process (point 6 of sec. 3.3). The deliverable of the review is a Security Review Report. The Security Review process consists of 6 steps, each described in a separate subsection below.
